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PRIVATE MOTIVATION, STATE ACTION AND
THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
VIOLATIONS
Barbara Rook Snyder t
In light of the substantial volume of scholarship concerning the
state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment, I some read-
t Associate Professor, The Ohio State University College of Law;J.D., The Univer-
sity of Chicago; B.A., The Ohio State University. I wish to thank my colleague, David
Goldberger, and my former colleagues, William Marshall and Melvyn Durchslag, for
their insightful comments on earlier drafts.
1 To compile a complete listing of the scholarship concerning the state action re-
quirement is difficult. Consequently, what follows is only a partial listing: LARRY ALEX-
ANDER & PAUL HORTON, WHOM DOES THE CONSTITUTION COMMAND? (1988); Glenn
Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL
L.Q. 375 (1958); Lawrence A. Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and Self-
Help Repossession, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 893 (1975); James D. Barnett, What is "State"
Action Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution?, 24 OR. L.
REv. 227 (1945); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State
Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967); Paul
Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 1296 (1982); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 503
(1985); HenryJ. Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 1289 (1982); Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the
Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 221; Frank I. Good-
man, Professor Brest on State Action and Liberal Theory, and a Postscript to Professor Stone, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 1331 (1982); Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion,
110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962); Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Ac-
tion" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957); Jody YoungJakosa,
Parsing Publicfrom Private: The Failure of Differential State Action Analysis, 19 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 193 (1984); Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A
Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 39; Thomas P. Lewis, The
Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960); Thomas P. Lewis, The Sit-in Cases:
Great Expectations, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 101 [hereinafter Lewis, The Sit-in Cases]; William P.
Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking "Rethinking State Action", 80 Nw. U.L.
REv. 558 (1985); Ira Nerken, A New Deal for the Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights:
Challenging the Doctrinal Bases of the Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory, 12 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 297 (1977); Monrad G. Paulsen, The Sit-in Cases of 1964: "But Answer
Came There None", 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 137; MichaelJ. Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of
Modern State Action Doctrine, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 683 (1984); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Dis-
crimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959);
Thomas G. Quinn, State Action: A Pathology and a Proposed Cure, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 146
(1976); Ronna Greff Schneider, State Action-Making Sense out of Chaos-An Historical Ap-
proach, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 737 (1985); Maimon Schwarzschild, Value Pluralism and the
Constitution: In Defense of the State Action Doctrine, 1988 Sup. CT. REv. 129; TheodoreJ. St.
Antoine, Color Blindness but Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection, and
"Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MIcH. L. REv. 993 (1961); Mark Tushnet, Shelley v.
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ers may have concluded that nothing more can be said on the sub-
ject.2 The basis for this voluminous commentary is the first three
words of the second sentence of the fourteenth amendment: "No
state shall. . . ."3 Those words, which do not sound controversial,4
are the source of complex questions of interpretation over which
courts and scholars alike have struggled for more than a century.
Much of the early scholarship suggested that the Supreme Court's
state action cases could not be explained by any coherent doctrine,
and several of the later commentators proposed that the state action
inquiry be eliminated altogether. Contrary to the recent trend in
state action literature, this Article suggests that distinguishing state
action from private action is not only consistent with the fourteenth
amendment, but also provides a coherent, logical approach to the
state action cases.
Notwithstanding the various proposals of the commentators,
the Supreme Court has continued to confuse the question of
whether state action is present with the question of whether a partic-
ular state action violates the Constitution. For example, in Shelley v.
Kraemer,5 the Court discussed at great length whether the state ac-
tion requirement was satisfied, 6 although action by the state, in the
form of the Missouri state court's decision to enforce a racially re-
strictive covenant, was "entirely obvious. ' ' 7 The difficult question in
Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 383 (1988); William W. Van
Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State Action, 1965 DUKE
L.J. 219; William W. Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3
(1961); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Prinpls of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1959); Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx. L. REv. 347 (1963).
2 Or, as Professor Black put it over twenty years ago, "'State action' again?"
Black, supra note 1, at 69.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The entire sentence reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id
4 Indeed, as early as 1879, the Supreme Court apparently had no difficulty in rec-
ognizing that the fourteenth amendment applied to state action and not to private con-
duct. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879) ("The prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States ...."); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313, 318 (1879) ("The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment... have reference to
State action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals.").
5 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
6 See GEOFFREY R. STONE, Louis M. SEIDMAN, CASs R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V.
TUSHNET, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 1491 (1986).
7 Wechsler, supra note 1, at 29. That the majority devoted so much of the opinion
to discussing whether state action was established is puzzling in light of the majority's
conclusion: "That the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capaci-
ties is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is a proposition which has long been established by decisions of this
Court." Shelley, 334 U.S. at 14.
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Shelley was whether the Missouri court's order amounted to a denial
of equal protection,8 yet the majority in Shelley deemed it "clear"
that the Missouri court's enforcement of the covenant violated the
fourteenth amendment.9 Similarly, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,' 0
the plaintiff sought an injunction ordering the Pennsylvania Liquor
Authority to revoke the liquor license of the Moose Lodge because
the Lodge discriminated on the basis of race in its membership and
guest policies." The granting of a liquor license by a state agency
was unquestionably state action within the meaning of the four-
teenth amendment. The only real issue, then, was whether that ac-
tion was unconstitutional. Unfortunately, the Court, instead of
explaining why Pennsylvania's action did not violate the fourteenth
amendment, stated that "the operation of the regulatory scheme en-
forced by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board does not suffi-
ciently implicate the State in the discriminatory guest policies of
Moose Lodge to make the latter 'state action' within the ambit of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 2 And in
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,' 3 the Court considered whether a private credi-
tor's use of a remedy authorized by a state statute was "properly
attributable" to the state,14 when it should have questioned the con-
stitutionality of the state statute that authorized the creditor's
remedy.
The purpose of this Article is to reconsider the state action
cases' 5 in which the Supreme Court has confused the state action
inquiry with the question of whether the state action violates the
fourteenth amendment. This Article suggests that the Court could
8 The plaintiffs who brought the suit to enforce the covenant argued that its en-
forcement would not deny defendants the equal protection of the laws "since the state
courts stand ready to enforce restrictive covenants excluding white persons from the
ownership or occupancy of property." Shelley, 334 U.S. at 21; c. Wechsler, supra note 1,
at 29 (suggesting that Sheley-which held that "the state may properly be charged with
the discrimination when it does no more than give effect to an agreement that the indi-
vidual involved is ... free to make"-is not based on a neutral principle of constitutional
law).
9 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
10 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
11 Il at 165.
12 Id at 177.
13 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
14 Id at 151-52.
15 This Article does not consider the so-called public function cases, although they
may be interpreted as imposing a duty on the state to act as discussed infra note 160.
See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (primary election conducted by a private
political party subject to the requirements of the fifteenth amendment); Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company-owned town governed by the first amendment).
The Supreme Court has distinguished the public function analysis from the state in-
volvement cases, and the Court has not used the public function rationale to decide a
case for a number of years.
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end this confusion by first distinguishing acts of state actors16 from
acts of private persons and then determining who was actually re-
sponsible for the alleged harm. If the Court were to conclude that
the state actors were responsible, it should proceed to determine
whether that state action was unconstitutional. The thesis of this
Article is that state action should be deemed to violate the Constitu-
tion in two categories of cases; first, when the acts of state actors
provide the impetus for private conduct that would be unconstitu-
tional if done directly by the state actors, and second, when the im-
petus for the alleged harm comes from the private party, but the
state action would be unconstitutional had no private initiative been
involved.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I proposes a broad
definition of state action as any official action taken by governmental
units or their agents.' 7 It argues that sound reasons support the
recognition of differences between state action and private action
even though private action may cause the same harm as state action
in some quantifiable sense.' 8 The distinction between private action
and state action discussed in Part I is important, notwithstanding my
expansive definition of state action, because the state action itself is
not always responsible for the alleged deprivation of a constitutional
right.
Part II explains why state action should be deemed to violate
the fourteenth amendment when it provides the impetus, by way of
compulsion or encouragement, for those private acts that would be
unconstitutional if they were undertaken by the state. It also dem-
onstrates how the proposed compulsion/encouragement approach
applies to particular cases. 19
Part III considers cases in which the impetus for the alleged
harm comes from a private party. It argues that the state may not be
involved in actions that otherwise would be unconstitutional but for
the fact that the initiative for the alleged harm came from a private
party. Part III applies this approach to real and hypothetical cases
in which the state enforced private wishes or private arrangements
or vindicated private interests. 20
The approach proposed in this Article directs the Court's focus
in state action cases to the correct issue: was the challenged state
16 I use the term "state actors" to denote federal or state governments, local gov-
ernmental units, agencies, officials, or employees-in other words, bodies or persons
who derive their authority from the government.
17 See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 58-161 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 162-208 and accompanying text.
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action responsible 2 for the harm that is alleged to constitute the
deprivation of a constitutional right?22 The approach is also useful
because it avoids the artificial "attribution" of some private action to
the state, a technique used by the Court in some cases. 23 Most im-
portantly, it preserves the public/private dichotomy in a manner
consistent with the language and long-accepted understanding of
the fourteenth amendment.2 4 By maintaining this distinction be-
tween state action and private conduct, this approach promotes
both individual autonomy and federalism, values identified by the
Supreme Court as significant functions of the state action
requirement.2 5
The term "state action" does not appear in the fourteenth
amendment itself;26 presumably it was coined by the Court. The
amendment simply states that "[n]o State shall" 27 violate equal pro-
tection or due process principles. If the words are given their ordi-
nary meaning, then state action should be understood as any
action 28 taken by a state or a state actor using authority derived
from the state, regardless of whether the action is authorized by, or
contrary to, law.2 9 In fact, the Supreme Court has defined state ac-
21 I use the phrase "responsible for the harm" rather than "causes the harm" be-
cause the concept of proximate cause connotes foreseeability. See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN
B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 42, at 273 (5th ed. 1984). Foreseeability would not adequately limit liability for
state action. For example, it is reasonably foreseeable that private parties will do many
things that are not prohibited by the state. The state, however, should not be held re-
sponsible for all these private acts merely because they are foreseeable. See infra notes
146-61 and accompanying text.
22 The Supreme Court has recognized that allocating the responsibility for consti-
tutional violations is a function of the state action doctrine. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) ("It . .. avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or
officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.").
23 See, e.g., id. at 937, discussed infra at notes 114-17 and accompanying text; Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 151-52 (1978), discussed infra at notes 106-13 and accom-
panying text.
24 See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
25 In Lugar, the Court stated that "[c]areful adherence to the 'state action' require-
ment preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and
federal judicial power." 457 U.S. at 936. Regarding federalism, the Court noted that
"[a] major consequence [of the state action doctrine] is to require the courts to respect
the limits of their own power as directed against state governments and private inter-
ests." Id at 936-37.
26 See supra note 3.
27 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28 Conscious inaction by a state or a state actor should also be considered state
action. See infra notes 146-48 & 161 and accompanying text.
29 Acts of state officials or employees may be contrary to controlling law, or beyond
the legal authority conferred, yet still be considered state action. As the Court
explained,
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tion in similar terms. As early as 1879, the Court stated:
[T]he prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment... have refer-
ence to actions of the political body denominated a State, by
whatever instruments or in whatever modes that action may be
taken. A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial
authorities. It can act in no other way. The constitutional provi-
sion, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the
officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government,
deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without due process
of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws,
violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name
and for the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his act is
that of the State.30
Notwithstanding this obvious meaning of the concept of state
action, Professor Sunstein has asserted that the courts have used a
different definition: "The cases confirm that the state action inquiry
is not a search for whether the state has 'acted,' but instead an ex-
amination of whether it has deviated from functions that are per-
ceived as normal and desirable."3' Although Professor Sunstein's
characterization of this normative definition as descriptive of what
courts have done in many state action cases is undoubtedly empiri-
cally correct, it has the effect of collapsing the state action inquiry
into the determination of the constitutionality of the state action.32
Acts by a state actor which are "normal and desirable" governmen-
tal activity should not be insulated from review under the fourteenth
amendment. And suggesting that acts by government actors consti-
tute state action only when those acts are "desirable"33 or "legiti-
[t]he settled construction of the [Fourteenth] Amendment is that it pre-
supposes the possibility of an abuse by a state officer or representative of
the powers possessed and deals with such a contingency .... That is to
say, the theory of the Amendment is that where an officer or other repre-
sentative of a State in the exercise of the authority with which he is
clothed misuses the power possessed to do a wrong forbidden by the
Amendment, inquiry concerning whether the State has authorized the
wrong is irrelevant and the Federal judicial power is competent to afford
redress for the wrong by dealing with the officer and the result of his
exertion of power.
Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287 (1913).
30 Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1879).
31 Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 887 (1987). According
to Professor Sunstein, the state action determination "has always depended on a base-
line establishing the legitimate or at least ordinary functions of government" and the
courts have "relied on common law baselines like those in Lochner." Id. at 886.
32 The analysis of fourteenth amendment cases suggested here requires a two-step
inquiry: first, is state action involved, and then, is that state action unconstitutional.
33 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 887.
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mate"3 4 seems implicitly to resolve the ultimate issue: when an act
by a state actor is "desirable" or "legitimate," it will probably be
deemed constitutional.
Professor Sunstein has also stated that a definition of state ac-
tion based on the ordinary meaning of the words "would be inade-
quate" because "[s]tate officials are involved in the enforcement of
private contract, tort, and property law every day, and their involve-
ment does not subject all private arrangements to constitutional
constraints."3 5 His observation, though true, does not lead inexora-
bly to the conclusion that defining state action to mean any official
act by a state actor is "inadequate." Like the Court, he has confused
the state action inquiry with the question of whether the conduct of
state actors should be measured by the principles of the fourteenth
amendment. Enforcement of private arrangements by state courts
or state police is state action, according to the ordinary meaning of
those words, but this recognition does not "subject all private ar-
rangements to constitutional constraints." The private action being
enforced is still private and therefore not subject to the restrictions
in the fourteenth amendment. Nonetheless, constitutional stan-
dards do apply to the state action of enforcement and, in a constitu-
tional challenge to such enforcement, the court must determine
whether that state action is consistent with applicable constitutional
provisions. 36 Professor Sunstein runs into a similar problem when
he discusses state inaction: "When the government fails to provide
protection against private racial discrimination, the failure is said
not to be 'state action' and thus raises no constitutional question. '37
According to the common-sense definition of state action suggested
here, however, a state's failure to prohibit private racial discrimina-
tion is state action, but that state action does not necessarily violate
the fourteenth amendment.38
Other commentators have attempted to avoid the problem of
defining state action by proposing that the state action inquiry be
eliminated because it serves no function independent of the sub-
stantive determination of the constitutionality of the challenged
practice. They have argued that the state action cases should be re-
solved by balancing the interests of the plaintiff against those of the
defendant, who is claimed to have violated the plaintiff's rights.
Professor (now Judge) Williams was one of the earliest proponents
of this approach. He asserted:
34 Id. at 886.
35 Id.
36 For a discussion Shelley v. Kraemer and other enforcement cases, see infra notes
162-208 and accompanying text.
37 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 886.
38 See infra notes 146-61 and accompanying text.
1990] 1059
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
A court decision resolving a private legal dispute is state action.
Police action in the enforcement of a private interest is state ac-
tion.... Indeed, all rights of private property and of contract are
based upon state law. So the enforcement of these laws is state
action.
The result is that it is difficult to conceive of situations where
state action is not present.3 9
He concluded that "the state action limitation, as a limitation, has
substantially disappeared" 40 and that the proper approach to resolv-
ing the cases was to balance the interests of the challenger against
the interests of the defendant. 41 Professors Glennon and Nowak
have taken a similar position. They argued that the Supreme Court
has "effectively removed any semblance of meaning from the state
action requirement" 42 and that in fact "the Court decides state ac-
tion cases by balancing the values which are advanced or limited by
each of the conflicting private rights."' 43 Similarly, Professor
Chemerinsky suggested that "[i]f the state action requirement were
abolished, the courts in each instance would determine whether the
infringer's freedom adequately justified permitting the alleged viola-
tion;"'4 4 in other words, the "courts would have to balance." 4 5
The problem with a balancing approach is that it ignores the
value of distinguishing state action from the acts of private parties.
Indeed, the proponents of balancing have argued that we should
not make such a distinction. Professor Chemerinsky stated that
"private infringements of basic freedoms can be just as harmful as
governmental infringements. '46 To support his position, he
39 Williams, supra note I, at 367 (citing Horowitz, supra note 1, at 209).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 369, 370-71, 372, 373, 375, 378, 387. For example, Professor Williams
characterized the issue in Shelley v. Kraemer as "whether in the balancing of interests the
right of the individual to discriminate must overweigh the constitutional interest against
discrimination." Id at 373.
42 GIennon & Nowak, supra note 1, at 222.
43 Id. at 226-27. For example, Glennon and Nowak interpreted Shelley v. Kraemer as
balancing "the interest of a former owner of property [against] the current owner's de-
sire to sell to a member of a racial minority and the injury done to members of a minor-
ity race by restrictive covenants." Id. at 239. They read Evans v. Newton as a balancing of
"the worth of private ownership of a park which is otherwise open to the public and the
injury inflicted upon members of racial minorities who are publicly excluded from that
area." Id. at 245. And in Reitman v. Mulkey, "It]he Court effectively balanced the right of
the current populace of California to have guaranteed freedom from open housing laws
against the burden on racial minorities from being denied access to the legislature for
redress of their problems." Id. at 247.
44 Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 506. He asserted that the state action requirement
"is anachronistic, harmful to the most important personal liberties, completely unneces-
sary, and even detrimental to the very goals that it originally intended to accomplish."
Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 510. Professor Chemerinsky went even further: he suggested that "the
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pointed to "the large concentrations of wealth and power in private
hands." 47
Obviously, the harm inflicted by private parties can be at least
as great, in some quantifiable sense, as that inflicted by governmen-
tal actors. There is, nevertheless, an important difference between
actions taken by government and those taken by private actors. One
might characterize this difference as symbolic, but such a descrip-
tion would not be entirely satisfying.48 More precisely, when a pri-
vate party acts, he does so on his own behalf (or perhaps on behalf
of his private employer or a private contractor who is paying for his
services). The motivation for that action is private. In contrast, the
actions of government officials are ostensibly taken on behalf of the
citizens they represent. The motivations for their actions should re-
flect not the actors' private interests but should emerge from the
actors' responsibility to act in the public interest. The representa-
tive nature of their roles is more than symbolic; it is real. Govern-
ment actors ultimately derive their authority and power from the
citizenry, who expect them to actively promote the public interest.
Compare, for example, the situation of a private detective who
commits an assault in the course of an investigation with that of a
police officer who commits an identical assault in the course of an
arrest. In each case, the severity of the victim's injuries may be iden-
tical. Or consider a hypothetical client who is refused tax advice
from a private attorney who harbors feelings of racial animus
against the client. Would the situation be different if the same client
were to seek tax information from the Internal Revenue Service and
be turned away because of his race? The harm, the denial of tax
information, is the same in both cases. And what difference does it
make to the owner whether his property is sold, without notice or a
need for court protection from private actions arguably is greater because democratic
processes, no matter how imprecise a check, impose some accountability and limits on
the government." Id at 511.
47 lId at 510. Professor Tushnet recently made the same point: he stated that "it is
doubtful that one could defend the proposition that governments in the contemporary
United States are in fact in a better position to inflict harm than private actors" and he
asked his readers to "compare the power of the City of New York, which is highly con-
strained by a complex political system, with the power of General Motors, which is not."
Tushnet, supra note 1, at 392.
48 Professor Tushnet acknowledged such an argument when he noted that state
action may be thought to "betray the trust of the citizenry, eliciting harm captured in a
statement like, 'But you're supposed to be on my side!'" Id. at 394-95. He gave the
argument short shrift, however:
I doubt that, at least in terms of subjective experience, people feel much
different when their power or water supplies are cut off pursuant to the
summary procedures adopted by a private utility.., than when the same
supplies are cut off pursuant to equally summary procedures adopted by
a municipal utility ....
Id. at 394.
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hearing, by a private storage company or by a sheriff? The value of
the lost property is identical in both cases.
Although the harms suffered by the victims in each of these hy-
pothetical cases appear to be the same, there is a significant differ-
ence between them. The private detective is acting only on his
client's behalf, not for the public. The attorney chooses clients for
private reasons, whereas the IRS agent is a public servant. And the
storage company, unlike the sheriff, does not represent the govern-
ment when it sells the property. There is a special relationship be-
tween government and the governed that simply does not exist
between private parties.
Justice Brennan expressed a similar view about the difference
between state and private action in the context of race
discrimination:
The state-action doctrine reflects the profound judgment that
denials of equal treatment, and particularly denials on account of
race or color, are singularly grave when government has or shares
responsibility for them. Government is the social organ to which
all in our society look for the promotion of liberty, justice, fair and
equal treatment, and the setting of worthy norms and goals for
social conduct. Therefore something is uniquely amiss in a soci-
ety where the government, the authoritative oracle of community
values, involves itself in racial discrimination. 49
Those statements apply equally to each of the values embodied in
the equal protection and due process clauses. Acts that undermine
those values "are singularly grave when government has or shares
responsibility for them."' 50
Perhaps this explains why the fourteenth amendment was
drafted to prohibit only state action that violates equal protection
and due process principles.5 1 The Supreme Court, in its earliest
fourteenth amendment decisions, understood the amendment as
distinguishing between state action and private action and restrict-
ing only the former. In Virginia v. Rives,52 decided in 1879, the
Court stated that "[t]he provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
... have reference to State action exclusively, and not to any action
of private individuals. ' 53 The Court reaffirmed its understanding of
the fourteenth amendment a few years later in the Civil Rights
49 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190-91 (1970) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
50 Id. at 190.
51 But see Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 511-15 (arguing that the Constitution and
the fourteenth amendment were not drafted to apply to private action "because it was
thought that the common law protected individual rights from private interference").
52 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
53 Id. at 318.
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Cases:54 "It is State action of a particular character that is prohib-
ited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject mat-
ter of the amendment. '55 The Court has continued to interpret the
fourteenth amendment based on the distinction between state and
private action. In Shelley v. Kraemer,5 6 the Court stated:
Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases .... the
principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law
that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of
the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely pri-
vate conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.5 7
The approach to state action cases proposed in this Article, which
distinguishes between state action and private action, is consistent
with the Court's understanding of the fourteenth amendment and
with its recognition that action by state actors is special because it
occurs in the context of the relationship between citizens and their
government.
Although the broad definition of state action suggested in this
Article leads to the conclusion that state action is present in a wide
variety of situations, the distinction between state action and private
action remains important. This broad definition merely shifts the
attention to the correct issue: whether a given state action is actu-
ally responsible for the alleged constitutional violation. Separating
state action from private action is necessary to allocate responsibility
for the harm alleged to be inconsistent with fourteenth amendment
values.
II
If the ordinary meaning of the term "state action" is employed
in a case in which a violation of the fourteenth amendment is al-
leged, and the court has determined that the state action require-
ment is satisfied (because the state or a state actor has acted58), the
court must then consider whether that state action is constitutional.
This task is quite straightforward when the only actors in the case
are state actors. It becomes more problematic when the alleged
constitutional violation involves action by both state actors and pri-
vate parties. The Supreme Court has used a variety of tests to de-
cide such cases, including whether "to some significant extent the
State in any of its manifestations has been found to have become
54 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
55 Id at 11.
56 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
57 Id at 13.
58 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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involved in" the harmful private conduct,59 "whether there is a suffi-
ciently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of
the [private] entity so that the action of the latter may fairly be
treated as that of the State itself,"'60 and whether "the [private] con-
duct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [may] be
fairly attributable to the State." 61 This Article contends that state
action should be deemed to violate the fourteenth amendment when
the state action provides the impetus for private conduct that would
violate the fourteenth amendment if undertaken by a state actor.
Specifically, state action is the impetus for such private conduct
when it amounts to compulsion or encouragement of the private
conduct. Although the Court has recognized this principle in some
state action decisions, 62 the Court has declined to follow it in several
other cases. 63 This inconsistent treatment of the state action doc-
trine has prompted a great deal of scholarly criticism. 64
There are four categories of cases in which the combination of
action by state and private actors has repeatedly led to confused
opinions by the Court. The Court's approach in each category is
considered and compared to the approach suggested by this Article.
The first category consists of cases in which the state compelled pri-
vate action that would have been unconstitutional if done by a state
actor. Such compulsion is obviously state action that violates the
fourteenth amendment. The private party who lacks choice should
not be held liable for the constitutional violation.
The second category consists of cases in which the state has en-
couraged private action that would be unconstitutional if undertaken
by a state actor. This encouragement is similarly unconstitutional.
In the third category of cases, the state has provided some bene-
fit, such as a license, a charter, or financial support, to a private party
who takes action that a state actor could not (constitutionally) pur-
sue. In such cases, courts should acknowledge that the provision of
some governmental benefit is state action and then determine
59 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
60 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
61 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
62 See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) ("[A] State normally can be
held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in
law be deemed to be that of the State.").
63 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 59-61; Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838
(1982) (fair attribution approach); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978) (fair
attribution approach).
64 See, e.g., Black, supra note 1, at 95 ("The field is a conceptual disaster area.");
Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 504-05 ("earlier commentators were . .. successful in
demonstrating the incoherence of the state action doctrine"); Glennon & Nowak, supra
note 1, at 222 ("In three decisions during the 1975 Term, the Justices effectively re-
moved any semblance of meaning from the state action requirement.").
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whether that action is constitutional. As long as the benefit is not
provided according to some constitutionally impermissible criteria,
that state action ordinarily should be deemed constitutional. How-
ever, the provision of the benefit may be unconstitutional in certain
cases because it amounts to compulsion or encouragement of a pri-
vate action that would be unconstitutional if undertaken by a state
actor.
The fourth category is comprised of cases in which there has
been state inaction in the face of private conduct that would have
violated the fourteenth amendment if done by a state actor. State
inaction is the functional equivalent of allowing the private party to
engage in the conduct at issue because the state has decided not to
interfere with or prohibit it.65 If the state has no affirmative duty to
take some action, state inaction should be considered constitutional
unless, in the circumstances of the particular case, it constitutes
compulsion or encouragement of the private action that would vio-
late the fourteenth amendment if undertaken by a state actor.
A. Compulsion
The clearest case for applying the standards of the fourteenth
amendment is when the state compels private action that would vio-
late the fourteenth amendment if taken by a state actor. The state
act of compulsion is the impetus for the private action and ulti-
mately for the deprivation of a constitutional right. In such a case,
the conduct of the private party is merely a response to the state
compulsion. As a result, the state action, not the private conduct, is
unconstitutional. The Court recognized this principle in Peterson v.
City of Greenville66 when it overturned the trespass convictions of
black youths who refused to leave a lunch counter after being re-
quested to do so by the manager. The state action challenged in
Peterson was not simply the use of the state's criminal justice system
in prosecuting the defendants for trespass, but also a city ordinance
that required racial segregation in restaurants. 67 The Court stated
that "[w]hen the State has commanded a particular result, it has
65 See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
66 373 U.S. 244 (1963). Peterson was one of a group of cases known collectively as
"the sit-in cases." They arose from the efforts of civil rights activists during the early
1960s to eliminate racial segregation in restaurants and other places of public accommo-
dation. The facts in the cases were basically the same: black persons, or black and white
persons together, were denied service in restaurants and then were arrested for trespass
if they refused to leave when requested to do so by the restaurant management. These
persons were usually convicted of criminal trespass, and they often challenged their con-
victions on constitutional grounds. Several of those cases reached the Supreme Court
during the 1963 and 1964 terms. See generally Lewis, The Sit-in Cases, supra note 1; Paul-
sen, supra note 1.
67 The ordinance provided:
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saved to itself the power to determine that result and thereby 'to a
significant extent' has 'become involved' in it, and, in fact, has re-
moved that decision from the sphere of private choice." 68 The
Court held that the trespass convictions in Peterson contravened the
fourteenth amendment because the restaurant owner was compelled
by the ordinance to ask some customers to leave. The customers'
refusal to leave after that request became the basis for their trespass
convictions. 69
A statutory command is not the only type of state action that
could amount to compulsion. An order from a state court directing
a private party to take an action that the fourteenth amendment
would prohibit a state actor from taking would also be unconstitu-
tional under this approach. Likewise, a command or threat of sanc-
tions from a state executive official would constitute state
compulsion. In Lombard v. Louisiana,70 a trespass case decided on
the same day as Peterson, the Court determined that a public state-
ment from the mayor of New Orleans that " 'no additional sit-in
demonstrations ... will be permitted' "71 was an "official command
... to direct continuance of segregated service in restaurants, and to
prohibit any conduct directed toward its discontinuance. '72 The
Court reversed the trespass convictions in Lombard by employing
the same analysis it had used in Peterson: the restaurant owner was
It shall be unlawful for any person owning, managing or controlling
any hotel, restaurant, cafe, eating house, boarding-house or similar estab-
lishment to furnish meals to white persons and colored persons in the
same room, or at the same table, or at the same counter; provided, how-
ever, that meals may be served to white persons and colored persons in
the same room where separate facilities are furnished. Separate facilities
shall be interpreted to mean:
(a) Separate eating utensils and separate dishes for the serving of
food, all of which shall be distinctly marked by some appropriate color
scheme or otherwise;
(b) Separate tables, counters or booths;
(c) A distance of at least thirty-five feet shall be maintained between
the area where white and colored persons are served;
(d) The area referred to in subsection (c) above shall not be vacant
but shall be occupied by the usual display counters and merchandise
found in a business concern of a similar nature;
(e) A separate facility shall be maintained and used for the cleaning
of eating utensils and dishes furnished the two races.
GREENVILLE, S.C. CODE § 31-8 (1953, as amended in 1958), quoted in Peterson, 373 U.S. at
246-47.
68 Peterson, 373 U.S. at 248 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715, 722 (1961)).
69 Id. at 247-48.
70 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
71 Id. at 271.
72 Id. at 273. The Court stated that "the city must be treated exactly as if it had an
ordinance" requiring racial segregation in restaurants because the mayor's "official
command ... has at least as much coercive effect as an ordinance." Id
[Vol. 75:10531066
STATE ACTION
compelled by the mayor's directive to ask certain customers to leave,
which led to the trespass charges and convictions. 73
One may question whether this compulsion analysis would yield
a different result if the state could establish that the private action
was not motivated by the state command. The state in Peterson con-
tended that the trespass convictions should be affirmed because
"the manager [of the lunch counter] would have acted as he did in-
dependently of the existence of the ordinance." 74 The Court re-
jected this argument:
When a state agency passes a law compelling persons to discrimi-
nate against other persons because of race, and the State's crimi-
nal processes are employed in a way which enforces the
discrimination mandated by that law, such a palpable violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be saved by attempting to
separate the mental urges of the discriminators.75
The Court's treatment of this issue does not go far enough.
The logical conclusion of Peterson is that only the state actor, and not
the private party, should be held liable for the constitutional viola-
tion that resulted from the state compulsion. When the state com-
pels a private party to discriminate against members of a racial
minority, it is the state action, not the private conduct, which is un-
constitutional. The state compulsion is unconstitutional even if no
private party actually obeys. 76
The Court has not, however, followed the compulsion principle
to its logical conclusion. The Court was not faced with the issue of
allocating liability in Peterson or Lombard because those cases were
challenges to the victims' trespass convictions rather than civil suits
for damages. The Court confronted the issue seven years later in a
civil rights suit concerning state compulsion of private racial segre-
gation. In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,77 a white plaintiff alleged that
she was denied service at a lunch counter in a store owned by S.H.
Kress and Company because she was accompanied by black persons.
She sued Kress for damages under section 1983.78 The Court reaf-
firmed the holdings of Peterson and Lombard: "'the State may not
use race or color as the basis for distinction. It may not do so by direct
action or through the medium of others who are under State compulsion to do
73 IdL at 272-74.
74 Petewson, 373 U.S. at 248.
75 Id.
76 This is analogous to the analysis used when a statute is challenged as unconstitu-
tional on its face.
77 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
78 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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so., "79 The Court also recognized in Adickes that compulsion may
take the form of "a custom having the force of law," 80 and that such
a custom may be proved in various ways."'
The Court's analysis in Adickes was problematic because it failed
to identify correctly the party responsible for the constitutional vio-
lation. As notedabove, the plaintiff in Adickes sued the private store
owner, not the state, under section 1983. The Court initially stated
that, "[f]or [the plaintiff] to recover... she must show a deprivation
of a right guaranteed to her by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."8 2 The Court then described the question
raised by Adickes:
[W]e must decide, for purposes of this case, the following "state
action" issue: Is there sufficient state action to prove a violation
of [the plaintiff's] Fourteenth Amendment rights if she shows that
Kress refused her service because of a state-enforced custom com-
pelling segregation of the races in Hattiesburg restaurants?83
The Court concluded that the plaintiff "will have made out a claim
under section 1983 for violation of her equal protection rights if she
proves that she was refused service by Kress because of a state-
enforced custom requiring racial segregation in Hattiesburg
restaurants."8 4
To suggest that the plaintiff could prevail in her action for dam-
79 Adickes, 398 U.S. at 171 (quoting Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F.2d 750, 756 (5th Cir.
1961) (emphasis added by the Supreme Court)).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 171-72. The trial court had assumed that the only way to prove that a
custom had the force of law was with evidence that it had been enforced by use of the
state's criminal trespass statute. The Supreme Court disagreed, and suggested other
possible methods of proof:
[Pjetitioner may be able to show that the police subjected her to false
arrest for vagrancy for the purpose of harassing and punishing her for
attempting to eat with black people. Alternatively, it might be shown on
remand that the Hattiesburg police would intentionally tolerate violence
or threats of violence directed toward those who violated the practice of
segregating the races at restaurants.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court also rejected the district court's position
that the plaintiff would have to show that this custom of segregation was in force
throughout the state: "In the same way that a law whose source is a town ordinance can
offend the Fourteenth Amendment even though it has less than state-wide application,
so too can a custom with the force of law in a political subdivision of a State offend the
Fourteenth Amendment even though it lacks state-wide application." Id at 173.
82 Id. at 169.
83 Id (emphasis added). One might read the facts in Adickes, as recounted by the
Supreme Court, as indicating that the Kress manager made the decision not to serve the
plaintiff and that the state enforced that decision by subsequently arresting the plaintiff
for vagrancy. The Court, however, as the quoted passage demonstrates, read the sub-
stantive count of the plaintiff's complaint as alleging that she was denied service because
of a state-enforced custom mandating racial segregation in restaurants.
84 Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
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ages against Kress, a private party, if she could establish that Kress
was compelled by the state to maintain segregated lunch counters is
inconsistent with the compulsion principle of Peterson. After all, why
should a private party who has been compelled to take some action by
the state be liable for the resulting harm? The Court acknowledged
in Peterson that, when the state compels a private party to take some
action, the state "has removed that decision from the sphere of pri-
vate choice."8 5 This principle should have led the Court to con-
clude that the state, and not the private party, should be liable for
the constitutional violation that it has compelled. This approach to
compulsion cases would obviously limit a plaintiff's opportunity to
recover damages for a constitutional violation caused by a private
party who was compelled by the state,8 6 but a private party in such a
case "is left with no choice of his own"8 7 and consequently should
not be deemed liable. Thus, separating state action from private
conduct is important, not only to determine whether a violation of
the fourteenth amendment has occurred, but also to allocate liability
properly.
B. Encouragement
Although state compulsion is the most obvious way for a state
to affect private conduct, state encouragement may also provide the
impetus for private action. Just as a state cannot compel private par-
ties to engage in conduct that would be unconstitutional if engaged
in by a state actor, neither should it be permitted to encourage such
conduct by private parties. When the challenged state action consti-
tutes encouragement of private action that a state actor could not
take, the state action is unconstitutional and the state, not the pri-
vate party, is responsible for the deprivation of the victim's constitu-
tional rights.
85 Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963).
86 A plaintiff could not recover damages in a suit against a state or a state official
acting in his official capacity for deprivation of a constitutional right, see Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) ("[IThe rule has evolved that a suit by private parties
seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment."), unless Congress abrogated the states' immunity
using its power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) ("Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legisla-
tion' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide
for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible
in other contexts."). As the law stands now, a plaintiff may sue state actors in their
individual capacities for damages, although they generally do not have deep pockets and
may be protected by official immunity. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). A plaintiff may also be able to bring an action
under state law against the private party or the state actors.
87 Peterson, 373 U.S. at 248.
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In Reitman v. Mulkey,88 the Supreme Court applied the encour-
agement rationale. 89 Reitman involved a challenge to an amendment
to the California constitution, commonly known as Proposition 14,
which gave a property owner the right "'to decline to sell, lease or
rent' " his property to anyone " 'as he, in his absolute discretion,
chooses.'"90 This constitutional amendment, which was approved
by the voters in a statewide referendum, effectively repealed a Cali-
fornia fair housing statute9 ' and narrowed the scope of a broad
equal rights law. 92 The United States Supreme Court agreed with
the California Supreme Court that Proposition 14 "would en-
courage and significantly involve the State in private racial discrimi-
nation contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment."93 The Court
concluded that Proposition 14 was more than "a mere repeal of" 94
existing statutes:
Private discriminations in housing were now not only free from
[the anti-discrimination statutes] but they also enjoyed a far differ-
ent status than was true before the passage of those statutes. The
right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on racial
grounds, was now embodied in the State's basic charter, immune
from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level of
88 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
89 The Court decided one other case, Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964),
using an encouragement rationale. This case is discussed infra at notes 98-105 and ac-
companying text.
90 Reitman, 387 U.S. at 371 (quoting CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 26). The main substan-
tive provision of Proposition 14 read:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny,
limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is
willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property,
to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as
he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
Id.
91 The Rumford Fair Housing Act made it unlawful for the owner of any housing
unit with more than four units "to refuse to sell, rent or lease or otherwise to deny to or
withhold from any person or group of persons such housing accommodation because of
the race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry of such person or person." CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35,720 (West 1967) (repealed 1980, now covered by CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 12,955). The statute also prohibited discrimination in the terms or condi-
tions of housing or the provision of facilities or services in connection with housing. Id
92 The Unruh Act provided:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal,
and no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever.
Reitman, 387 U.S. at 372 n.3 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 51). The statute was amended in
1961 to include sex as a prohibited basis for discrimination, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West
Supp. 1982), and was amended again in 1987 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
"blindness or other physicial disability." CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1989).
93 Reitman, 387 U.S. at 376.
94 Id
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the state government. Those practicing racial discriminations
need no longer rely solely on their personal choice. They could
now invoke express constitutional authority, free from censure or
interference of any kind from official sources.95
The Reitman decision is based on the principle that a state may
not pursue indirectly, through encouragement of private action, a
policy that the state could not constitutionally pursue directly.9 6 In
Reitman, the state had departed from neutrality by encouraging pri-
vate property owners to discriminate on the basis of race. The en-
couragement took the form of Proposition 14, which sent a message
to the people of California that, if they chose to discriminate on the
basis of race in renting or selling their property, they would have the
protection of the state in implementing that choice. The state's de-
cision to articulate that message in a constitutional amendment dif-
fers significantly from a state decision merely not to prohibit private
race discrimination in the housing market. The legal effect in the
two situations is the same (i.e., that private property owners will be
able to discriminate on the basis of race in selling or renting their
property). But the state action involved is not. Enshrining the right
of private property owners to engage in race discrimination in a
constitutional amendment is a departure from neutrality; declining
to prohibit race discrimination is not. In the latter case, an owner's
decision to discriminate on the basis of race would be private and
not influenced by a signal from the state that such discrimination is
protected under the state constitution. 97
The Court also applied the encouragement rationale in Robinson
v. Florida,98 a sit-in case99 decided after Peterson.100 In Robinson, the
95 Id at 377.
96 The Court made a similar statement about compulsion in Adickes. See supra text
accompanying note 79.
97 Ai alternative approach to the one suggested above would be to treat both kinds
of state action--creating a right to discriminate and not prohibiting discrimination-as
the same since the legal effect is the same; in both situations, the private party may
lawfully engage in the conduct. In his dissenting opinion in Reitman, justice Harlan rec-
ognized this possibility: "Every act of private discrimination is either forbidden by state
law or permitted by it. There can be little doubt that such permissiveness-whether by
express constitutional or statutory provision, or implicit in the common law-to some
extent 'encourages' those who wish to discriminate to do so." Reitman, 387 U.S. at 394
(Harlan, J., dissenting). If both types of state action were considered unconstitutional,
then states would have a duty to prohibit all private action that state actors could not
constitutionally undertake. This result is consistent with the approach of scholars who
have advocated the abolition of the state action requirement, but, as noted in Part I of
this Article, that approach would effectively eliminate the distinction between the public
and private spheres preserved in the fourteenth amendment. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 39-57.
98 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
99 See supra note 66.
100 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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defendants were arrested after refusing to leave a restaurant in
which they were denied service because of their race. 0 1 In Robinson,
unlike Peterson, no state statute, ordinance, or regulation required
racial segregation in restaurants.'0 2 The Court in Robinson never-
theless found unconstitutional state action in the form of a state
health regulation 03 and a state-issued manual on "Food and Drink
Services" that required separate facilities for each race. 104 The
Court concluded: "While these Florida regulations do not directly
and expressly forbid restaurants to serve both white and colored
people together, they certainly embody a state policy putting bur-
dens upon any restaurant which serves both races, burdens bound
to discourage the serving of the two races together."' 05 Although
the Court did not explicitly say so, a fair reading of its decision is
that the state policy was unconstitutional because it encouraged ra-
cial segregation in restaurants by discouraging integration.
Despite the Reitman and Robinson precedents, the Court has not
applied the encouragement rationale to other cases in which it
would have been appropriate. For example, application of the en-
couragement rationale would have led to a different analysis in Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks.10 6 In that case, Mrs. Brooks alleged that Flagg Broth-
ers, a private storage company, intended to deprive her of her prop-
erty without due process. Her belongings had been stored by Flagg
Brothers 10 7 and, when she failed to pay the storage charges, Flagg
Brothers threatened to sell her furniture pursuant to a provision of
the Uniform Commercial Code enacted in New York which permit-
ted such a sale without a hearing.'0 8 The Supreme Court found that
the case involved private, not state action, because the state "per-
mit[ted] but [did] not compel" Flagg Brothers to sell the goods.' 0 9
The U.C.C. provision at issue in Flagg Bros. is clearly state action
under the definition suggested in Part I above. That state action is
unconstitutional under the encouragement approach because it sent
101 "At the trial, the.., management explained that, while Negroes were welcomed
as customers in the store's other departments, serving Negroes in the restaurant would
be 'very detrimental to our business' because of the objections of white customers."
Robinson, 378 U.S at 154.
102 See id. at 156.
103 According to the Court, the regulation required separate restrooms "'where
colored persons are employed or accommodated.' " Id. (quoting FLA. SANITARY CODE, C.
VII, § 6).
104 See id.
105 Id.
106 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
107 Mrs. Brooks had been evicted from her apartment, and the city marshall had
contacted Flagg Brothers to pick up and store her possessions. Id. at 153.
108 N.Y. U.C.C. LAw § 7-210 (McKinney 1964) (amended 1982), quoted in Flagg Bros.,
436 U.S. at 151 n.1.
109 Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 165.
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the same message to storage companies in New York as Proposition
14 sent to those who wished to discriminate on the basis of race in
housing in California: if you choose to engage in this sort of con-
duct, you will have the approval and the protection of the state. The
effect is also the same-to encourage private parties to engage in
conduct that would be unconstitutional if committed by a state ac-
tor. 110 If a state wishes to approve a procedure whereby storage
companies may sell goods to recover storage charges due from the
owner, that procedure must comport with the due process clause.
Though the U.C.C. provision should have been held unconstitu-
tional under the encouragement approach, Flagg Brothers should
not have been held liable for damages. It was the state action, in the
form of the statute, which was responsible for the violation of Mrs.
Brooks's due process right. Flagg Brothers, the private party,
merely responded to the state's message of encouragement. Mrs.
Brooks should have been entitled only to a declaration that the stat-
ute was unconstitutional.
In rejecting the encouragement rationale, the Court in Flagg
Bros. stated that:
If New York had no commercial statutes at all, its courts would
still be faced with the decision whether to prohibit or to permit
the sort of sale threatened here the first time an aggrieved bailor
came before them for relief. A judicial decision to deny relief
would be no less an "authorization" or "encouragement" of that
sale than the legislature's decision embodied in this statute.... If
the mere denial of judicial relief is considered sufficient encour-
agement to make the State responsible for those private acts, all
private deprivations of property would be converted into public
acts whenever the State, for whatever reason, denies relief sought
by the putative property owner. 11
The Court correctly recognized that a judicial decision is just as
much a state action as is a statute. The real issue is whether such a
court decision is constitutional, and Reitman says that state action
that encourages private conduct is unconstitutional if the same ac-
tion committed by a state actor would violate the Constitution.
The hypothetical court decision would be unconstitutional if it
constituted encouragement. The Court in Reitman, however, recog-
nized a difference between "the mere repeal" of the fair housing
statute and encouragement of private racial discrimination in hous-
110 This analysis assumes that the procedure authorized in U.C.G. § 7-210 would
violate the due process clause if it authorized the state to sell stored goods without pro-
viding an opportunity for the owner to be heard. The Supreme Court made the same
assumption in Flagg Bros. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTrITTONAL CHOICES 254 (1985).
111 Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 165.
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ing.112 By the same token, a significant difference exists between
not prohibiting self-help remedies and creating a right for storage
companies to use such remedies. Assume, as the Court in Flagg
Bros. hypothesized, that the state had not enacted U.C.C. section 2-
710 and that Flagg Brothers threatened to sell Mrs. Brooks's furni-
ture. If Mrs. Brooks had sued Flagg Brothers in state court, the
court might have held that the sale did not amount to conversion
under state law and was not prohibited by any other state law. Such
a decision would be analogous to the "mere repeal" of prior stat-
utes discussed in Reitman. The legal effect of the court decision and
the repeal of the fair housing law would be the same: the private
action would not be deemed illegal and therefore could continue.
The state has remained neutral by refusing to take a position; pri-
vate parties may decide to engage in the action or not, and the state
will not interfere with the decision.
In the alternative, if the state court had declared that a com-
mon-law rule gave storage companies the right to sell stored goods
to recover unpaid storage charges without an opportunity for the
owner to be heard, that decision would be analogous to the encour-
agement of Proposition 14. In such a case, the state has departed
from neutrality by guaranteeing the warehouser the right to sell the
debtor's property without a hearing. The private storage companies
then "need no longer rely solely on their personal choice. They
could now invoke express [state] authority. . ...113
The difference between a state court denying relief to Mrs.
Brooks and announcing a common-law right for warehousers to sell
stored goods without a hearing is like the difference between a
"mere repeal" of a fair housing law and Proposition 14 in Reitman.
The message sent by the state is not the same. When the state legis-
lature repeals a statute, or a state court denies relief to a plaintiff,
the state may be seen as declining to take a position on the private
action at issue; the state is merely refusing to prohibit the private
action, but it is not willing to take the additional step of promoting
the private action either. The state sends an entirely different
message when it guarantees, through a statute, a constitutional pro-
vision, or the common law, the right to engage in the private action.
The message sent to private parties then is not, "do what you want,
the state will not interfere," but rather, "go ahead, the state is be-
hind you, and if anyone challenges your action, the state will sup-
port and protect your right to engage in that action."
112 Robinson v. Florida, 387 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1967).
113 Id. at 377. Whether or not some particular state action constitutes encourage-
ment will be in some cases a close factual question. That line-drawing may be difficult,
however, does not mean that courts should decline to do it.
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Application of the encouragement analysis to the facts of Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co. 114 would have altered the analysis in that case as
well. Lugar owed money to one of his suppliers, Edmondson Oil
Company. Edmondson sued on the debt in state court and re-
quested the state court to attach some of Lugar's property prior to
judgment in the case. The state prejudgment attachment procedure
"required only that Edmondson allege, in an ex parte petition, a be-
lief that [Lugar] was disposing of or might dispose of his property in
order to defeat his creditors."'1 15 The clerk of the state court issued
a writ of attachment and the sheriff executed it.116 Lugar then sued
Edmondson under section 1983 for deprivation of his property
without due process.
The Supreme Court adopted an artificial and needlessly confus-
ing approach to resolving the state action issue. The Lugar Court
characterized the issue as whether "the conduct allegedly causing
the deprivation of a federal right [may] be fairly attributable to the
State." ' 1 7 Lugar, like all of the state action cases, involved both state
and private action. The question the Court should have addressed
in Lugar was whether the state action constituted encouragement of
private action that would violate the due process clause if taken by a
state actor. The answer, on the facts of Lugar, is yes. Like Proposi-
tion 14 in Reitman and the U.C.C. provision in Flagg Bros., the state's
prejudgment attachment procedure sent a message to private par-
ties. In Lugar, the message from the state to private creditors was, if
you want to attach a debtor's property before judgment without a
prior hearing and without any showing that the debtor might be
alienating property to defeat creditors' claims, the state will help
you. That state imprimatur encouraged private parties to utilize
an attachment procedure that did not comport with due process
principles. The issue is not whether the private action is "fairly at-
tributable" to the state but whether the state action itself is
unconstitutional.
114 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
115 Id at 924.
116 The attachment order was subsequently vacated by the state court after a hearing
at which the court determined that Edmondson had failed to establish that Lugar was or
might be disposing of his property to defeat claims of his creditors. See id. at 925.
117 Id. at 937. The Court went on to state its "two-part approach to this question of
'fair attribution' ":
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
State or by a person for whom the State is responsible.... Second, the
party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be
said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because
he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state offi-
cials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.
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The Court in Lugar held that the debtor-plaintiff could maintain
his section 1983 claim against the private creditor for deprivation of
his property without due process. Under the proposed analysis, that
is the wrong result. The state statute that approved the procedure
for prejudgment attachment provided the impetus for the creditor's
actions. This state action amounts to encouragement of private ac-
tion that would, if taken by a state actor, be a violation of the due
process clause. The state action, therefore, and not the action of the
private creditor, violated the fourteenth amendment. Thus the
state, not the private creditor, should be held responsible for the
deprivation of the debtor's property without due process of law.
C. Benefits
State action also intersects with private conduct when the state
provides some sort of benefit to a private party. A benefit may take
several forms, including a tax exemption, a license, or financial sup-
port. When the state grants a benefit to a private party who engages
in conduct that would violate the Constitution if committed by a
state actor, the provision of the benefit is unquestionably state ac-
tion. As long as the state did not use constitutionally impermissible
criteria in deciding who would receive the benefit, 1 " granting the
benefit is not unconstitutional state action unless it amounts to com-
pulsion or encouragement of the private conduct. 1 19
The Supreme Court considered the state action implications of
granting a state benefit in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis. 120 The consti-
tution of the Moose Lodge restricted membership to white males, 121
and the Lodge allowed members to invite only white guests to
Lodge functions.' 22 The Moose Lodge chapter in Harrisburg ob-
118 The state could not, for example, give some state license or benefit only to white
applicants. Cf Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
119 Whether the state's provision of a benefit to a private party constitutes encour-
agement of private action that would be unconstitutional if taken by a state actor will
often depend on the circumstances. In some cases, only a fine line may separate the
mere provision of a benefit on the one hand and encouragement on the other. For
example, the provision of a benefit accompanied by "a wink and a nod" from a state
official might amount to encouragement.
120 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
121 The Lodge also discriminated on other grounds, as is indicated in the excerpt
from its constitution quoted by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion:
"The membership of lodges shall be composed of male persons of the
Caucasian or White race above the age of twenty-one years, and not mar-
ried to someone of any other than the Caucasian or White race, who are
of good moral character, physically and mentally normal, who shall pro-
fess a belief in a Supreme Being."
Id. at 181 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting the Moose Lodge Constitution).
122 The Lodge originally had no explicit racial component to its policy on guests,
but the Supreme Court noted that "the bylaws of the Supreme Lodge ha[d] been altered
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tained a liquor license from the state of Pennsylvania. In order to
retain the license, a licensee must comply with the regulations of the
state Liquor Control Board, including one that required that
"'[e]very club licensee shall adhere to all of the provisions of its
Constitution and By-Laws.' ",123 The Court concluded that enforce-
ment of the regulation should be enjoined "insofar as that regula-
tion requires compliance by Moose Lodge with provisions of its
constitution and bylaws containing racially discriminatory provi-
sions."' 124 Justice Douglas accurately characterized the state's issu-
ance of the liquor license on the condition that the licensee comply
with the regulation as state compulsion of race discrimination by the
Moose Lodge. 125
The Court in Moose Lodge also decided a second and more diffi-
cult issue. The plaintiff contended that the state's grant of the li-
quor license turned the Moose Lodge policy of racial discrimination
into an unconstitutional state action. The Supreme Court rejected
this argument, despite the fact that the grant of the license by the
state Liquor Control Board plainly was a state action. The major-
ity's holding turned on a different point, however; it correctly held
that the discrimination was private in nature. Granting a liquor li-
cense to a private club with racially discriminatory membership and
guest policies was not unconstitutional state action, at least in the
absence of the regulation that compelled compliance with the licen-
see's constitution and by-laws. 126 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, noted that, with the exception of the one invalid regula-
tion, "there is no suggestion in this record that the Pennsylvania
statutes and regulations governing the sale of liquor are intended
either overtly or covertly to encourage discrimination."'' 27 Addi-
tionally, he found, again excepting the unenforceable regulation,
that "the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board plays absolutely no
part in establishing or enforcing the membership or guest policies
of the club that it licenses to serve liquor."' 28
since the lower court decision to make applicable to guests the same sort of racial re-
strictions as are presently applicable to members." Id. at 178.
123 Id. at 177 (quoting Regulations of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
§ 113.09 (June 1970 ed.)).
124 Id. at 179.
125 Id. at 181 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He quoted a statement from Adickes: "'a
State is responsible for the discriminatory act of a private party when the State, by its
law, has compelled the act.'" Id. (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
170 (1970)). Justice Douglas also cited Peterson. Id
126 The majority invalidated the regulation that required licensees to comply with
their own constitution and by-laws, id. at 179, but considered separately the constitu-
tionality of the granting of the liquor license to the Moose Lodge. Id. at 177.
127 Id. at 173.
128 Id. at 175 (footnote omitted).
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The Supreme Court in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak 129 con-
sidered another challenge to a state licensing and regulatory scheme
due to objectionable conduct by a licensee. Congress had granted a
franchise to a private transit company to operate buses and street-
cars in the District of Columbia and provided that the transit com-
pany be regulated by the Public Utilities Commission for the District
of Columbia. The transit company had radio speakers installed in
its buses and streetcars and arranged for a local radio station to
transmit programs. A few passengers complained that the radio
programs interfered with their ability to converse. The Commission
investigated, but determined that the radio programming did not
impair "'public comfort and convenience.' "130 The complaining
passengers, alleging that the radio broadcasts violated the first
amendment, subsequently sued the Commission. The Supreme
Court found that the first amendment was triggered because of the
"sufficiently close relation between the Federal Government and the
radio service."' 3 1 The Court mentioned some factors in support of
its conclusion that the state action requirement was satisfied, includ-
ing the Commission's "regulatory supervision" of the transit com-
pany and the Commission's investigation of the radio policy. 132 The
Court then decided that the radio broadcasts on the buses and
streetcars did not violate the first amendment. 133
Application of the proposed compulsion/encouragement analy-
sis in Pollak would have achieved the same result but by a different
route. The grant of the franchise, the regulation by the Commis-
sion, and the investigation of the radio programming all constitute
state action under the definition suggested in Part I. The question
the Court should have asked was whether those actions were uncon-
stitutional; that is, did any of those acts, either individually or in
combination, amount to compulsion or encouragement of action by
the transit company that would have been unconstitutional if done
by a state actor? The answer would have been "no" for two reasons.
First, the state action of granting a franchise did not compel or en-
courage the private transit company to broadcast the radio pro-
grams on the buses. Second, even if the state had compelled or
encouraged the radio broadcasts, the transit company's playing the
radio programs on the buses did not violate the first amendment
because it would not have been unconstitutional for a state-owned
transit company to broadcast radio programs on buses. 134 Under
129 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
130 Id. at 459.
131 Id. at 462.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 463.
134 The Court reached essentially that conclusion when it decided that the first
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the approach advocated by this Article, state compulsion or encour-
agement of private conduct does not violate the Constitution if the
conduct would not be unconstitutional if undertaken by a state
actor.
The state action of granting a license to a private party is not
unconstitutional merely because the licensee engages in conduct
that would violate the Constitution if done by a state actor.'3 5
Where the licensing is not the equivalent of compelling or encour-
aging a private party to take a course of action that would be uncon-
stitutional if taken by a state actor, the impetus for the conduct of
the private party does not come from the state, and the state is not
responsible for it. In such a situation, the grant of a license is state
action which is constitutional, and the acts of the private party, how-
ever distasteful, are private acts for which the state is not responsi-
ble and which consequently are not prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment.' 3 6
Financial assistance from the state is another type of benefit.
Under the definition of state action proposed in Part I, the state acts
when it provides such financial assistance to a private party. As long
as the financial benefit is not provided according to constitutionally
impermissible criteria,13 7 the state action of providing a financial
benefit to a private party who engages in conduct that would be un-
constitutional for a state actor to engage in is constitutional, unless
the provision of the financial benefit constitutes compulsion or en-
couragement of that private action. The facts of Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn 13 8 illustrate this principle. A private high school for students
with special needs discharged several teachers from theirjobs. The
school received almost all of its operating funds from governmental
amendment applied to the transit company's policy of playing radio programs on its
buses and streetcars but that such policy did not violate the first amendment. See id. at
462-63.
135 Justice Rehnquist stated in Moose Lodge that "the operation of the regulatory
scheme enforced by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board does not sufficiently impli-
cate the state in the discriminatory guest policies of Moose Lodge to make the latter
'state action' within the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 177. The holding might be better stated, under the
approach advocated here, as: The operation of the regulatory scheme enforced by the
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board is state action, but it does not violate the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The discriminatory guest policy of the
Moose Lodge is not state action, nor was it compelled or encouraged by state action,
and therefore it is not prohibited by the fourteenth amendment.
136 Private acts may, of course, be prohibited by federal or state statutes. For exam-
ple, a state could require, as a condition of being granted a liquor license, that licensees
adhere to a nondiscriminatory policy in serving guests.
137 For example, the state could not decide to give financial aid on the basis of race
without a compelling justification. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989).
138 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
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sources. 139 The provision of the some of the funds was conditioned
on compliance with state regulations.1 40 In their section 1983 suit
against the school, the teachers alleged that they were discharged
for expressing their views in violation of the first, fifth, and four-
teenth amendments.141 The Court stated: "The core issue
presented in this case is not whether petitioners were discharged
because of their speech or without adequate procedural protections,
but whether the school's action in discharging them can fairly be
seen as state action."1 42 The Court examined a number of fac-
tors 1 43 and concluded that the state action requirement was not sat-
isfied because "the discharge decisions of the New Perspectives
School [were not] fairly attributable to the State." 144
The Court's analysis in Rendell-Baker is flawed. Governmental
funding and regulation are obviously state actions. The Court
should have conceded this and then considered whether those ac-
tions violated the Constitution. Because neither the funding nor the
regulation amounted to compulsion or even encouragement of the
discharges by the private school, 145 the state actions were not un-
constitutional. Thus, the discharges were the result of a private de-
cision for which the state was not responsible.
As with licensing, the state action of providing some financial
benefit to a private party does not become unconstitutional merely
because the recipient takes action that a state actor could not (con-
stitutionally) take. The state is not responsible for that private ac-
tion unless the state action provided the impetus for it by
compelling or encouraging it. If, on the facts of a particular case,
the provision of a benefit is the equivalent of compelling or encour-
aging such private action, then the private party should not be held
liable for the constitutional violation.
139 Massachusetts law required local schools to educate students with special needs
but permitted the schools to pay tuition for special-needs students at an appropriate
private school if the school did not have a suitable program of its own. Many of the
students at the high school involved in the Rendell-Baker case had been referred by local
schools. See id. at 832 & n.1. The school also received money from state and federal
agencies. See id. at 832. According to the Court, "[i]n recent years, public funds have
accounted for at least 90%, and in one year 99%, of respondent school's operating
budget." Id.
140 See id. at 833.
141 Id. at 835.
142 Id. at 838 (footnote omitted).
143 The Court considered the governmental funding and the governmental regula-
tion, among other factors. See id. at 840-41.
144 Id. at 840.
145 The Court found specifically that "the decisions to discharge the petitioners
were not compelled or even influenced by any state regulation." Id. at 841. Although
the Court did not say so, the same was true of the funding.
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D. Inaction
Yet another difficult area of constitutional adjudication in which
state action intersects with private conduct is acquiescence or inac-
tion by state actors in the face of conduct by private parties that
state actors could not (constitutionally) undertake. Such acquies-
cence or deliberate inaction by a state or a state actor would also be
state action under the approach proposed here. Justice Harlan once
suggested that every act that is not prohibited by state law is permit-
ted by state law. 146 Professor Brest pointed out, from a positivist
perspective, that "any private action acquiesced in by the state can
be seen to derive its power from the state."' 47 Identifying acquies-
cence or conscious inaction as state action does not mean, however,
that the private conduct acquiesced in is subject to constitutional
review. Only state action, or in this case state inaction, triggers re-
view under the fourteenth amendment. Conscious state inaction1 48
effectively allows the performance of private acts that are not pro-
hibited. As long as the state actor had no duty to act, conscious
state inaction should not be considered unconstitutional. Nonethe-
less, inaction that amounts to encouragement of private action that
would violate the fourteenth amendment if taken by a state actor
would be unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has sometimes found that a state actor has
an affirmative duty to interfere with or prohibit particular private
action. Professors Stone, Seidman, Sunstein, and Tushnet have
suggested 149 that Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority150 is such a
case. The Parking Authority, an agency created by state statute to
provide parking facilities for the public, built a parking garage in
downtown Wilmington, Delaware. The Authority decided to lease
some of the space in the parking garage building to help pay for the
garage.
Subsequently, the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, one of the lessees, re-
fused to serve a black customer who, in turn, brought suit in state
court against Eagle and the Parking Authority. The Supreme Court
146 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 394 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
147 Brest, supra note 1, at 1301.
148 When state inaction is not conscious or deliberate, as when no state actor knows
of a particular course of conduct by private parties, state inaction should not be consid-
ered state action. A state actor "acts" when she decides to do nothing to interfere with
or prohibit some private activity, but a state actor is not "acting," in the ordinary sense
of the word, when she is unaware of the private action. This distinction between con-
scious inaction and unknowing inaction does not, however, have any effect on the deter-
mination on the merits. If a state actor does nothing to prohibit a private activity
because the state actor is not aware of it, that inaction obviously could not be considered
state compulsion or encouragement of the activity.
149 G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, & M. TusHNET, supra note 6, at 1503.
150 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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held that "when a State leases public property in the manner and for
the purpose shown to have been the case here, the proscriptions of
the Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with by the lessee as
certainly as though they were binding covenants written into the
agreement itself." 151 The Court effectively imposed a duty on the
state to include an anti-discrimination provision in leases of public
property. 152 The Court in Burton should have addressed its order to
the state agency, the Parking Authority, because the equal protec-
tion clause applies only to state action and the discrimination by Ea-
gle was private action. The holding then would have been phrased
more clearly in terms of a duty owed by the state: when a state
leases public property in the manner and for the purpose shown to
have been the case here, the state must require the lessee to comply
with the terms of the fourteenth amendment.
The majority in Burton did not clearly articulate exactly which
factors triggered the state's obligation to prohibit private racial dis-
crimination when the state usually has no such duty. 153 Justice
Clark's opinion for the majority, however, mentioned several rele-
vant factors, noting that "[t]he land and building were publicly
owned,"1 54 the state paid for maintenance and repairs,155 "the com-
mercially leased areas . . .constituted a physically and financially
integral and, indeed, indispensable part of the State's plan to oper-
ate its project as a self-sustaining unit,"'156 and that Eagle benefitted
from the garage as a source of convenient parking. 157 The Court
noted particularly that, "in view of Eagle's affirmative allegation that
for it to serve Negroes would itijure its business, . . . profits earned
by discrimination not only contribute to, but also are indispensable
elements in, the financial success of a government agency."' 58 Ar-
151 Id. at 726.
152 The Delaware Chancery Court in Burton suggested that the state could have in-
cluded such a provision in its lease with Eagle. See id. at 725.
153 The majority stated that "readily applicable formulae may not be fashioned" and
suggested that its conclusion was based on the particular "facts and circumstances of
this record." Id. The majority opinion in Burton also contains the often-quoted lan-
guage, "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involve-
ment of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Id. at 722.
154 Id. at 723.
155 Id. at 724.
156 Id at 723-24. Prior to construction, experts had advised the Authority that pro-
jected revenues from parking would not be enough to pay the debt incurred to finance
the facility. Id. at 719.
157 Id. at 724.
158 Id. The majority also indicated that the Parking Authority "located at appropri-
ate places [on the building] official signs indicating the public character of the building,
and flew from mastheads on the roof both the state and national flags." Id at 720. As
Professors Stone, Seidman, Sunstein, and Tushnet observed, however, the presence of
state symbols does not explain why the Court found that the state had a duty to prohibit
Eagle from adhering to a policy of racial discrimination:
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guably, the two most important factors were the "symbiotic relation-
ship"'159 between the Parking Authority and Eagle, and the fact that
the private racial discrimination occurred in a publicly owned build-
ing. The Court has not subsequently used the Burton symbiotic rela-
tionship test to impose a duty on the state to interfere with or
prohibit private conduct. 160
Absent any state duty to prohibit or interfere with private ac-
tion, state acquiescence or conscious inaction should be deemed
constitutional unless it amounts to compulsion or encouragement,
which would be unlikely. Recall the hypothetical case posited by the
Supreme Court in Flagg Bros. :161 in the absence of relevant statutory
authorization, Flagg Brothers threatens to sell Mrs. Brooks's furni-
If Eagle's presence in the building subtly communicates state approval of
its policies, this must be because we believe that in this context the state
has an affirmative obligation to control policies of which it disapproves.
But even if this were true, we would still be faced with the task of explain-
ing what it is about this context that triggers this obligation.
G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSrEIN, & M. TuSHNEr, supra note 6, at 1507.
159 This is how the Court in subsequent opinions characterized the relationship be-
tween the Parking Authority and Eagle. E.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 843
(1982); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972).
160 The decisions of the Supreme Court in the public function cases might also be
interpreted as imposing a duty on a state actor to regulate private conduct. In Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), the Court found a violation of the fifteenth amendment
when a private political party (theJaybird Party) permitted only white persons to vote in
its pre-Democratic primary elections. Although there was no majority opinion, Justice
Black, writing for himself and two otherJustices, noted that, for the past fifty years, the
winner of theJaybird election had almost always won both the subsequent Democratic
primary and the general election. Justice Black concluded: "For a state to permit such a
duplication of its election processes is to permit a flagrant abuse of those processes to
defeat the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment." It at 469 (opinion of Black, J.). And
Justice Clark, in a concurring opinion joined by three fellowJustices, stated that, "when
a state structures its electoral apparatus in a form which devolves upon a political organ-
ization the uncontested choice of public officials, that organization itself, in whatever
disguise, takes on those attributes of government which draw the Constitution's safe-
guards into play." Id at 484 (Clark, J., concurring). Like Burton, the holding in Teny
could have been phrased in terms of a duty to act: if a state permits a private political
party to hold the only, for all practical purposes, primary election, the state must require
that party to conduct the election in a nondiscriminatory manner in compliance with the
fifteenth amendment. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the Court held that
regulations promulgated by the company-owned town of Chickasaw, Alabama violated
the first amendment. Alternatively, the Court could have held that the state, which had
sanctioned the company's ownership of the town, was responsible for ensuring town
compliance with the first amendment.
In addition, the courts have found in a number of section 1983 cases that state
actors have a duty to act. See, e.g., Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F.2d 729, 732 (10th Cir.
1981) (county liable for "failure of its Commissioners adequately to fund, or oversee the
general policies of, the county jail"); Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 201 (2d Cir.)
("where senior personnel have knowledge of a pattern of constitutionally offensive acts
by their subordinates but fail to take remedial steps, the municipality may be held liable
for a subsequent violation if the superior's inaction amounts to deliberate indifference
or tacit authorization of the offensive acts"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980).
161 See supra text accompanying note 111.
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ture. She files suit against the company in state court. If the state
court denies her relief on the ground that no state law prohibits the
sale, the state court has acted, but that state action is not unconstitu-
tional. In this hypothetical case, the state has decided not to take a
position regarding the lack of a hearing before a warehouser may
sell stored goods to recover unpaid storage charges. The state has
no duty to prohibit the sale or to require a hearing. Thus, although
the state has permitted the private action, the impetus for it has
come from the private party and is based on private motivation. In
such a case, the state should not be responsible for the private
action.
III
Judicial treatment of the state action issue in cases in which the
government is asked to enforce the wishes of private parties poses
analytical problems related to those raised by the compulsion/
encQuragement cases discussed in the previous section. These cases
generally fall into three categories. In the first, the state court ap-
plies common law or statutory rules to a dispute between private
parties. For example, if private parties enter into a contract and one
party fails to perform, the other party will sue, seeking a state court
judgment awarding either equitable relief1 62 or damages. 163 The
second category concerns wills and trusts. A testator or settlor
writes a will or trust, and a state court is asked later to enforce the
provisions. 16 In the third category of cases, a private property
owner asks the police to enforce the owner's desire to force an unin-
vited guest off the property. 165 The courts have often addressed
these cases in a confused and inconsistent manner. Future cases
could be better resolved by asking whether the state, in enforcing
the wishes of private parties, is required to draw lines or take other
actions that violate the Constitution. The state should not be per-
mitted to defer to the wishes of private parties to avoid constitu-
tional limitations on state action. State action that violates the
Constitution is no more justifiable when the motivation for the ac-
tion comes from private parties than it is when the motivation for
the action comes from state actors.
Shelley v. Kraemer 166 is, of course, the leading case in this group.
162 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), discussed infra at notes 166-71
and accompanying text.
163 See, e.g., Barrows v.Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), discussed infra at notes 180-85
and accompanying text; Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955),
discussed infra at notes 186-94 and accompanying text.
164 See infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
165 See infra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
166 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The facts of the case are well known. A group of property
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It is also perhaps the easiest case to analyze under the approach
suggested here. In Shelley, the order of the Missouri Supreme Court
sustaining the enforcement of the racially restrictive covenant was
plainly state action.1 67 The Missouri court directed the trial court to
enter judgment for the neighboring property owners (the plaintiffs
in the original suit) and to divest the Shelleys, the black purchasers,
of their tide to the property. 168 That state action violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because it was a de-
cision based explicitly on race. In ordering the enforcement of the
covenant, the state court determined that the plaintiffs were entitled
to judgment only after taking notice of the race of the Shelleys. The
covenant stated:
[H]ereafter no part of said property or any portion thereof shall
be, for said term of Fifty-years, occupied by any person not of the
Caucasian race, it being intended hereby to restrict the use of said
property for said period of time against the occupancy as owners
or tenants of any portion of said property for resident or other
purpose by people of the Negro or Mongolian Race. 169
When the state court enforced this covenant, it decided in favor of
the plaintiffs on the ground that the Shelleys were not white.' 70
Even though the racial motivation in Shelley originated with the pri-
vate parties (the signatories of the restrictive covenant), the Mis-
souri court's decision was racially discriminatory on its face. Under
well-settled equal protection doctrine, a governmental classification
that discriminates against members of a racial minority will be struck
down unless it is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental
goal.171
owners who lived on the same block in St. Louis, Missouri, signed a covenant restricting
occupancy of the property to white people. One parcel subject to the covenant was
purchased from the white owners by a black couple, the Shelleys. Title was transferred
first from the original owners to Fitzgerald, a straw party obtained by the realtor, and
then to the Shelleys. The Kraemers, owners of another parcel subject to the covenant,
sued both the Shelleys and Fitzgerald to enforce the covenant. The plaintiffs asked the
state court to enjoin the Shelleys from continuing to occupy the property and to divest
them of title. The trial court ordered the relief requested, and the Missouri Supreme
Court affirmed. Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 679 (1946), rev'd, 334
U.S. 1 (1948). A Michigan case with similar facts was consolidated with Shelley for argu-
ment and decision by the Supreme Court. Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d
638 (1947), rev'd sub nom. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
167 See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 1, at 29.
168 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 6.
169 Id. at 4-5.
170 Id. at 5.
171 See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984). Indeed, "no [govern-
mental] classification [burdening members of racial minorities] has been upheld since
1945 .. " 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITIIONAL LAW
§ 18.5, at 363 (1986); see also City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 721,
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Similarly, in Palmore v. Sidoti,172 the Court invalidated a state
court decision based on race under the equal protection clause. In
Palmore, a Florida court, applying the "best interests of the child"
test, 173 awarded custody of Ms. Palmore's child to her ex-husband
because her new husband was black. 174 The Supreme Court first
held that the state court decision was state action 75 based on race
and therefore "subject to the most exacting scrutiny."' 76  The
Court conceded that the state's interest in protecting children was
compelling and that "[t]here is a risk that a child living with a step-
parent of a different race may be subject to a variety of pressures
and stresses not present if the child were living with parents of the
same racial or ethnic origin."' 177 Nevertheless, the Court concluded
that "the reality of private biases and the possible injury they might
inflict are [not] permissible considerations for removal of an infant
child from the custody of its natural mother."' 178
Although Palmore, unlike Shelley, is not generally considered
controversial, 179 the cases are consistent. In Shelley, the Missouri
court held for the white property owners because the Shelleys were
black; in Palmore, the Florida court held for Ms. Palmore's ex-hus-
band because her husband was black. The lesson of Shelley, reaf-
firmed in Palmore, is simply that a private party is not entitled to have
its wishes enforced by the government when such enforcement
would be unconstitutional. The private motivation in such a case
ceases to be private when it becomes the basis for governmental
action.
ChiefJustice Vinson, who wrote the majority opinion in Shelley,
attempted to distinguish between a court order to a now-reluctant
seller prohibiting him from selling to a black buyer and a court or-
der to a seller who breached the covenant to pay damages to neigh-
735 (1989) (five Justices agreed that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications by
government, regardless of which race is burdened).
172 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
173 This standard was required by Florida law. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(1)
(1983), cited in Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
174 The Supreme Court characterized the Florida court as "entirely candid" because
it "made no effort to place its holding on any ground other than race." Id. at 432. The
Court thus had no difficulty concluding that the result in the state court action "would
have been different had petitioner married a Caucasian male of similar respectability."
Id.
175 Id at 432 n.l ("The actions of state courts and judicial officers in their official
capacity have long been held to be state action governed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.") (citations omitted).
176 Id. at 432.
177 Id at 433.
178 Id.
179 In fact, the decision in Palmore was unanimous and Chief'Justice Burger's opinion
comprised only four and one-half pages in the United States Reports.
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boring property owners. In Barrows v. Jackson,180 the Court held that
a state court could not, consistent with the equal protection clause,
order a party who breached a racially restrictive covenant to pay
damages to the other parties to the covenant. The majority in Bar-
rows reasoned that, "[i]f a state court awards damages for breach of a
restrictive covenant, a prospective seller of restricted land will either
refuse to sell to non-Caucasians or else will require non-Caucasians
to pay a higher price to meet the damages which the seller may in-
cur." 18' The Court concluded that awarding such damages was
state action that violated the fourteenth amendment.'8 2 In his Bar-
rows dissent, ChiefJustice Vinson argued that the state court should
have been able to order the party who breached the covenant to pay
damages because here, unlike Shelley, "there [was] no identifiable
non-Caucasian... who will be denied any right to buy, occupy or
otherwise enjoy the properties involved in this lawsuit."' 8 3
Barrows was correctly decided under the approach suggested in
this Article. Although Barrows, unlike Shelley, did not involve a state
court ordering a seller not to sell to a black buyer, a state court
awarding damages for breach of a restrictive covenant would still
have to base its decision on race. The only real difference between
Barrows and Shelley was that the black buyers were parties to the law-
suit in Shelley, whereas in Barrows they were not. This distinction
should not change the outcome. The state court in Barrows would
still have to decide which party would prevail by considering the
race of the non-party purchasers. As the majority in Barrows recog-
nized, allowing a state court to award damages for the breach of a
racially restrictive covenant would mean that "[s]olely because of
their race, non-Caucasians will be unable to purchase, own, and en-
joy property on the same terms as Caucasians."'u 4 Such a race-
based decision by a state court is unconstitutional because it could
not be justified as necessary to further any compelling governmental
interest.'85
Cases involving the enforcement of private contracts should be
analyzed in a manner consistent with the reading of Shelley proposed
here. For example, in Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 18 6 the
180 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
181 Id. at 254.
182 Id
183 Id at 262 (Vinson, CJ., dissenting). "Indeed, the non-Caucasian occupants of
the property involved in this case will continue their occupancy undisturbed, regardless
of the outcome of the suit." Id.
184 Id. at 254.
185 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
186 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953), aff'd, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), vacated and cert.
dismissed, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
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plaintiff contracted to purchase a cemetery plot for her deceased
husband, a Native American. The contract specified that "burial
privileges accrue only to members of the Caucasian race." 187 When
the cemetery refused to bury her husband, she sued for breach of
contract. She contended that the racial restriction in the contract
could not be enforced in light of Shelley. 188 The trial court held that
the racial restriction was unenforceable but could be relied on to
defend a breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court of Iowa af-
firmed. 189 The United States Supreme Court initially affirmed with-
out an opinion, 190 but, on rehearing, it vacated that decision and
dismissed the writ of certiorari, citing a newly passed Iowa
statute. 191
The Iowa court's decision in Rice is inconsistent with the read-
ing of Shelley suggested in this Article. The state court correctly
found the racial restriction unenforceable because a court would
have had to use a racial classification to enforce the provision. The
state court erred, however, when it permitted the cemetery to assert
the racial restriction as a defense to the claim for breach. Consider-
ing the provision as a defense required the court to decide the case
on the basis of the race of Mrs. Rice's deceased husband; she lost
her claim in state court only because her husband was not a "mem-
ber[] of the Caucasian race." The decision by the state court was
just as clearly racially discriminatory as ordering the cemetery not to
bury a non-white. The Iowa Supreme Court's distinction between
"direct" or "active" aid of private discrimination and "indirect...
support of private agreements containing restrictive covenants,' 92
like ChiefJustice Vinson's distinction between Shelley and Barrows,193
cannot support different results in cases in which the state court has
explicitly based a decision on race. Any time a state court bases a
decision on race, the decision should be subjected to strict scrutiny.
The Iowa court's judgment in favor of the cemetery should have
been struck down under that standard; no compelling goal justified
the decision allowing the cemetery to rely on a discriminatory con-
187 Id. at 150, 60 N.W.2d at 112.
188 Id. at 154, 60 N.W.2d at 115.
189 Id. at 155-56, 60 N.W.2d at 115-16.
190 348 U.S. 880 (1954).
191 349 U.S. 70 (1955). The Iowa statute prohibited race discrimination by ceme-
teries, but it exempted those owned or operated by churches, other religious organiza-
tions, and established fraternal societies. See id. at 75-76.
192 Rice, 245 Iowa at 155, 60 N.W.2d at 115. The court stated that Shelley "may be
distinguished from our present case in that [it involved] the exertion of governmental
power directly to aid in discrimination .. " Id., 60 N.W.2d at 115. The court character-
ized "the recognition of [racial] clauses in private contracts" as involving "no active aid
... given their enforcement." Id., 60 N.W.2d at 115.
193 See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
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tract term, and thereby to avoid paying damages. 194
This interpretation of the constitutional limits on the power of
state courts certainly restricts the types of provisions that private
parties may include in their contracts. They could not expect a
court to enforce a racial restriction like the one in the contract be-
tween Mrs. Rice and the cemetery. This does not mean, however,
that a private cemetery is prohibited by the Constitution from exer-
cising any choice in such a situation. The cemetery could still con-
stitutionally refuse to contract to bury a particular person as long as
the private racial motivation remained private.' 95 Although Mrs.
Rice would still be unable to bury her husband in that particular
cemetery, the harm she would suffer in that case would have been
inflicted solely by the cemetery.
Evans v. Newton 196 and Evans v. Abney 197 are consistent with the
proposed reading of Shelley. The controversy in those cases arose
from Senator Bacon's will. He devised land to the City of Macon,
Georgia, as trustee, to be operated as a park for the exclusive use
and enjoyment of whites. The Supreme Court decided in Evans v.
Newton that the city's involvement in the operation and maintenance
of the park brought the facility within the ambit of the fourteenth
amendment and that therefore it could not remain segregated. 198
In the wake of that decision, the Georgia Supreme Court deter-
mined that the trust failed because Senator Bacon's purpose of cre-
ating a park exclusively for whites was impossible to achieve.' 99 The
194 Enforcement of private contracts could not be considered a compelling state
goal in light of the numerous and varied reasons, unrelated to the Constitution, that
state courts sometimes give for refusing to enforce private contracts. For example, state
courts have refused to enforce private contracts that are deemed contrary to public pol-
icy. See, e.g., Bovard v. American Horse Enters., 201 Cal. App. 3d 832, 841, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 340, 345 (1988) (contract to purchase a business that manufactured drug para-
phernalia unenforceable as contrary to public policy because it would facilitate illegal
drug use); Blue Dolphin Invs., Ltd. v. Kane, 687 P.2d 533, 534 (Colo. App. 1984) (fol-
lowing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRATrs § 194 (1981) that "[a] promise that tor-
tiously interferes with performance of a contract with a third person or a tortiously
induced promise to commit a breach of contract is unenforceable on grounds of public
policy").
195 Of course, race discrimination in making and enforcing private contracts is pro-
hibited by section 1981. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982); see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
196 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
197 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
198 Newton, 382 U.S. at 302.
199 Evans v. Newton, 221 Ga. 870, 871, 148 S.E.2d 329, 330, afd, 382 U.S. 296
(1966). According to the Georgia Supreme Court, the doctrine of cy pres could not be
used to reform the trust because Senator Bacon's will did not indicate that he had any
general charitable purpose when he created the trust:
Senator Bacon in the provision of his will creating [the trust] was specific
in listing the persons for whose benefit the trust was created, the benefi-
ciaries being "the white women . . .and white children of the City of
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court therefore ordered that the property revert to Senator Bacon's
heirs. 200 The United States Supreme Court affirmed. 20 1
The Court merely followed the teaching of Shelley in these cases.
In Newton, the Court found that Senator Bacon's private desire to
maintain segregation was no longer private when the city became
involved with the enforcement of the segregation. City officials
could not, consistent with the fourteenth amendment, decide who
could use the park on the basis of race. But the state court's judg-
ment in Abney that the trust had failed and that the land should,
therefore, revert to the heirs did not violate the Constitution. The
state court followed common law principles in a race-neutral way;
the decision not to apply cy pres to reform the trust was based not on
anyone's race, but on an examination of Senator Bacon's wishes re-
garding the trust. Senator Bacon's desire that the park be operated
on a segregated basis or not at all remained "private" as long as the
state court did not have to base its actions on race.
Does the theory proposed here mean that a testator cannot
leave his property to whomever he chooses? A testator may leave
his property to any person he chooses, but he cannot expect a state
court to enforce certain restrictions if such enforcement would vio-
late the equal protection clause.
Consider a hypothetical situation: A testator, T, is white and
believes that his children should marry someone of the same race. T
has two children, A and B. A is married to a person who is not white.
T decides for that reason to leave nothing to A in his will ("to my
child, A, I leave nothing"). After T's death, A challenges the will on
the grounds that it would be unconstitutional for the state probate
court to enforce the will as written because her disinheritance was
based on racial prejudice. According to the theory proposed here,
she would lose the suit. The state court, in enforcing the terms of
the will, would not have to base its decision on any criteria prohib-
ited by the Constitution.
Assume that B is not yet married. T decides to leave B his en-
Macon." He empowered the board of managers to exercise their discre-
tion in also admitting "white men of the City of Macon, and white per-
sons of other communities." He left no doubt as to his wish that the park
be operated on a segregated basis. After expressing his kind feelings to-
ward persons of the Negro race, he stated his reasons for limiting the
beneficiaries of the trust to white persons as follows: "I am, however,
without hesitation in the opinion that in their social relations the two
races should be forever separate and that they should not have pleasure
or recreation grounds to be used or enjoyed, together and in common."
Evans v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 830, 165 S.E.2d 160, 164 (1968), a fd, 396 U.S. 435
(1970).
200 Abney, 224 Ga. at 833, 165 S.E.2d at 166.
201 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
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tire estate on the condition that, if she marries, she marries a white
man. After T's death, B marries a person who is not white. She
challenges the will and argues that enforcement of the racial restric-
tion would be unconstitutional. According to the theory proposed
here, she should prevail. To enforce the provision in the will, the
probate court would have to decide the case by looking at the race
of B's husband; if he is white, B wins and if he is not white, B loses.
The explicit use of a racial classification by the probate court would
fail under strict scrutiny, just as it did in Shelley.
In this hypothetical case, A and B would both suffer the same
harm if the will were enforced: they would each lose their share of
T's estate because of T's feelings about interracial marriage. (Simi-
larly, in Shelley, had the covenant been enforced, the Shelleys would
have lost the property because of the racial prejudice of the other
homeowners.) If they suffer the same harm, then what justifies the
different outcomes of the two challenges to the will? In A's case, T's
motivation remained private; the will simply excluded A from the list
of beneficiaries. In B's case, T's private motivation became the ba-
sis for the state action, the court decision.
The foregoing analysis relates to an earlier point: there is a dif-
ference between the harm inflicted by a private party on another
private party and the harm inflicted by government on a private
party. In A's case, the racial prejudice originated with T and the
state remained neutral. In B's case, the racial prejudice also
originated with T, but the state would have made itself a part of that
racial discrimination if it had enforced the racial restriction in the
will. Such enforcement would constitute state action in violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.20 2
The third category of enforcement cases, the trespass cases,
present one of the classic dilemmas of traditional state action doc-
trine. Bell v. Maryland203 was another sit-in20 4 case brought before
the Supreme Court. Although the Court did not decide the case on
constitutional grounds, 205 its facts raise the issue of state enforce-
ment of private discrimination.
Bell concerned a sit-in demonstration in 1960 at Hooper's res-
202 This approach does, of course, limit testamentary freedom. Testators and their
lawyers will draft provisions (similar to the provision in A's case) to avoid explicit classifi-
cations based on racial or other impermissible criteria. But because the equal protection
clause specifically prohibits states from basing decisions on racial grounds unless such
decisions are justifiable under strict scrutiny, the freedom of testators must be restricted.
203 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
204 See supra note 66.
205 The Supreme Court did not address the constitutional issues presented because
of an intervening change in state law. After the defendants had been convicted, but
prior to the Supreme Court's ruling, the Maryland Legislature enacted a statute that
prohibited discrimination in public accommodations (including restaurants). As a re-
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taurant in Baltimore. Twelve black students took seats in the restau-
rant and asked to be served. The hostess, acting on instructions
from Mr. Hooper, asked them to leave and advised them that they
would not be served "'solely on the basis of their color.' "206 The
students were arrested for trespass20 7 after Mr. Hooper swore out
warrants; they were later convicted of the trespass charges. 208
Consider the facts of Bell as the basis of two hypothetical cases
to illustrate the application of the approach proposed here to the
sit-in cases. In the first hypothetical case, assume that Mr. Hooper
told the local police chief that he had a policy of not serving black
customers in his restaurant and that if any police officer ever noticed
a black customer in the restaurant, the officer should ask the cus-
tomer to leave and forcibly remove him if necessary. A police officer
walking by Hooper's restaurant sees a black man waiting to be
seated. Pursuant to Mr. Hooper's instructions, the police officer
asks the man to leave and, when the black man refuses, arrests him
for trespassing. According to the suggested analysis, the man
should be able to challenge successfully his arrest and/or conviction
as a violation of the fourteenth amendment. The police officer, in
enforcing Mr. Hooper's request, had to decide which person to
arrest based on race. If the customer had been white, he would not
have been arrested. The same would be true of a conviction in such
a case. Neither a police officer nor a court can, consistent with the
equal protection clause, impose a burden or grant a benefit based
solely on race unless such discrimination can be justified as neces-
sary to achieve a compelling governmental goal.
Assume now that Mr. Hooper, instead of leaving general in-
structions with the police, calls the police each time a black person
enters his store. If the police arrest a black person after one of these
calls, could the arrest or a subsequent conviction be successfully
challenged under the equal protection clause? The answer should
suIt, the Court vacated the convictions and remanded the cases to state court for recon-
sideration in light of the new statute.
Most of the sit-in cases involving hotels, restaurants, theatres, and other places of
public accommodation, would not be decided on constitutional grounds today. Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to a-6(1982), prohibits race discrimi-
nation in places of public accommodation that "affect interstate commerce" as defined
in the statute. Id. § 2000a(b), (c). The constitutional issues may still arise, however, in
other contexts; the statute contains an exclusion for private clubs, id. § 2000a(e), and
does not apply to private homes.
206 Bell, 378 U.S. at 227-28.
207 The Maryland trespass statute made it a misdemeanor to "'enter upon or cross
over the land, premises or private property of any person ... after having been duly
notified by the owner or his agent not to do so.'" Id. at 228 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 577 (1957)).
208 Id. Their convictions were subsequently affirmed by the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals, 227 Md. 302, 176 A.2d 771 (1962), rev'd, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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be no, because the state actor (the police officer) did not act on the
basis of race. He arrested a person who refused to leave after re-
quested to do so by the restaurant owner.
The harm to the black person in both cases is the same. He
cannot get served in Hooper's restaurant and is arrested if he re-
fuses to leave. What justifies the different treatment in the two
cases? In the first case, Mr. Hooper's private wish to discriminate
on the basis of race was not private when it became the basis for the
state action of arresting and/or convicting the black customer. In
the second case, Mr. Hooper's private wish to discriminate re-
mained private; the state action in that case was based on Mr.
Hooper's request that a particular customer leave the premises.
As in the cases involving contracts and wills and trusts, the pro-
posed enforcement approach means that private parties will still be
able to ask the state to enforce certain of their wishes. But they will
not be able to do so if such enforcement would require a state actor
to make decisions based on constitutionally impermissible criteria
or otherwise take action that would violate the Constitution. There
is no exception to the fourteenth amendment when a state actor is
merely enforcing a private motivation. The distinction drawn by the
fourteenth amendment between state action, which is covered by its
terms, and private action, which is not, means that the state may
enforce Mr. Hooper's wishes in the second case, however distasteful
they may be to others, but not in the first case.
CONCLUSION
The state action cases involving action by both state actors and
private parties present difficult analytical problems for courts. The
Supreme Court should continue to treat state action as a threshold
requirement that must be satisfied before the substantive provisions
of the fourteenth amendment are triggered. Adopting the broad
definition of state action suggested in Part I would acknowledge the
important differences between state action and private conduct and
would permit the Court to maintain state action as a threshold ele-
ment to a fourteenth amendment claim.
Once the Court has determined that state action is present, the
Court should review the state action, not the private action, in light
of fourteenth amendment values. According to the approach pro-
posed in this Article, the Court should separate the state action from
the private conduct because only the former is subject to the restric-
tions of the fourteenth amendment. As posited in Part II, if the
state action provided the impetus for, by compelling or encourag-
ing, private action that would be unconstitutional if undertaken by a
state actor, that state action should be deemed violative of the Con-
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stitution. Even when the impetus for the private conduct came from
a private party, the state should not be permitted to violate the four-
teenth amendment in order to enforce a private arrangement or vin-
dicate private interests, as demonstrated in Part III.
This approach to state action cases allows courts to recognize
that private and state action may intersect and result in the depriva-
tion of constitutional rights. But the state action and private con-
duct must be separated analytically in order to correctly determine
whether the state action was responsible for a constitutional viola-
tion. This separation of state action from private action would elim-
inate the need for courts to attempt to "attribute" the conduct of
private parties to the state. Most importantly, this approach would
preserve the public/private dichotomy that underlies the fourteenth
amendment.
